Privacy in Social Media: The Right of Publicity by Kernan, S. Michael
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 34 | Number 3 Article 3
1-1-2012
Privacy in Social Media: The Right of Publicity
S. Michael Kernan
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
S. Michael Kernan, Privacy in Social Media: The Right of Publicity, 34 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 363 (2012).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol34/iss3/3
 363 
Privacy in Social Media:
The Right of Publicity 
by 
S. MICHAEL KERNAN 
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 364
II. Recent Right of Publicity Cases ....................................................................................... 364
III. Elements of the Common Law Right of Publicity ......................................................... 365
A. State Statutory Right of Publicity Claims ................................................................ 366
1. The California Right of Publicity Statute ........................................................ 366
2. The New York Right of Publicity Statute ....................................................... 367
IV. Defenses to Right of Publicity Actions in Social Media ................................................ 367
A. Immunity Under Section 230 of the CDA ............................................................... 368
1. First Circuit ........................................................................................................ 368
2. Second Circuit .................................................................................................... 368
3. Ninth Circuit ...................................................................................................... 369
4. Eleventh Circuit ................................................................................................. 369
B. Plaintiff Consented to the Use of Right of Publicity .............................................. 371
C. First Amendment Defense ........................................................................................ 375
V. How Social Media Companies and Other Websitesb  Can Protect Themselves
From Right of Publicity Claims .................................................................................. 376
A. Terms of Use .............................................................................................................. 376
B. Acceptance of Terms of Use by the Users .............................................................. 377
C. Notice of Modification .............................................................................................. 378
VI. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 378
  S. Michael Kernan was first exposed to entertainment law when he was Executive 
Associate Editor of the Hastings Communications & Entertainment Law Journal.   He 
serves as Adjunct Professor of Law at U.C. Hastings, teaching “Entertainment Law” and 
“Social Media Law & Business.”  His focus is on privacy in digital media, and the 
convergence of traditional and digital media.  Mr. Kernan is the co-founder and CEO of 
NuMedia Studios and Management, a digital media and consulting company that creates 
digital media content, and provides consulting services on digital media issues.  He also 
remains active in the judicial arena working on digital media issues as of counsel for a law 
firm he helped launch.  Prior to NuMedia, Mr. Kernan was the Co-Head of Digital Media 
at International Creative Management (ICM), overseeing the digital media efforts for 
ICM’s Los Angeles, New York and London offices.  He began his entertainment law 
career in Los Angeles with the firm of Lavely & Singer, where he handled numerous 
privacy actions.  He regularly speaks on digital media issues and has published several 
articles pertaining to digital media and resolution of media disputes.  Originally from St. 
Louis, Mr. Kernan is a member of the California Bar, having attended the University of 
California, Hastings College of Law, and Saint Louis University Law School.  He received 
undergraduate degrees in economics and finance from yhe University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, and is a graduate of Harvard Business School. 
 364 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:3
I. Introduction
As we live our lives on social media websites like Facebook and 
Twitter, there is a growing concern regarding the right of privacy on 
websites.  For the websites themselves, as well as their advertisers, 
there is often no clear direction, but only a myriad of common law 
cases to guide them in what is and is not permitted. 
At the same time, as websites monetize using an advertising 
model, that monetization is colliding with one of the four privacy 
claims: the right of publicity.  The right of publicity has been heavily 
litigated lately, particularly against Facebook as it attempts to 
monetize its massive user base. 
This Comment is the first of four covering each of the four privacy 
claims in relation to social media.  It begins with recent litigation on 
the right of privacy, then explains right of publicity claims and 
defenses, and suggests a framework for websites to obtain the 
“consent” of their users to avoid right of publicity claims. 
II. Recent Right of Publicity Cases
On December 16, 2011, a federal judge refused to dismiss a class 
action lawsuit against Facebook for violating the class’s right of 
publicity.1  Specifically, the class challenged Facebook’s practice of 
running “Sponsored Story” advertisements, which include the names 
of a user’s friends who like that advertisement.2  The class alleged that 
the conduct was a “commercial appropriation” of the friends’ 
likenesses.3 
Two other class actions against Facebook for violation of right of 
publicity have also garnered a great deal of attention this past year.4  
The first addresses the right of publicity in the context of minors 
(under eighteen) who use Facebook.5  That action was brought by a 
minor Facebook user’s parent, alleging that the minor’s name and 
likeness was appropriated for commercial advantage without the 
consent of his parents, as required by section 50 of the New York 
1. Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11-CV-01726-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145195




5. Amended Complaint, J.N. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11-cv-2128 (E.D.N.Y. May 3,
2011). 
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Civil Rights Code.6  Section 50 provides that a living person’s name, 
portrait or picture may not be used for advertising purposes without 
the person’s written consent, “or if a minor of his parent or 
guardian.”7  The other federal lawsuit, filed in California, alleged the 
taking of the adult users’ name and likeness.8  On June 28, 2011, the 
district court granted Facebook’s motion to dismiss on the ground, 
among others, that the users consented to the use of their names and 
likenesses.9 
To explain the bases of these lawsuits, it helps to address the 
claims for right of publicity, both statutory (state law) and common 
law. 
III. Elements of the Common Law Right of Publicity
The Court has held that to establish a prima facie case for 
violating one’s common law right of publicity (misappropriation of 
plaintiff’s picture or name) only one element need be proved—
namely, the unauthorized use by defendant of plaintiff’s picture or 
name for defendant’s commercial advantage.10  The Zacchini case is 
the one and only time the United States Supreme Court has reviewed 
the right of publicity. 
In Zacchini, the plaintiff was the famous “human cannonball” 
who objected to his entire fifteen-second performance being televised 
on the local news.11  He argued that the value of his act depended on 
the public’s desire to witness the event, so televising the event 
detracted from the demand of people willing to pay to see his act.12  
The defendant, Scripps, argued that it was newsworthy, and asserted 
a First Amendment defense.13  The Court recognized Zacchini’s right 
of publicity and rejected Scripps’s First Amendment defense.14 
The Court explained that the basis of the right of publicity, much 
like the Copyright Act, is not merely to ensure compensation to the 
plaintiff.15  Rather, the purpose of the right of publicity is to provide 
“an economic incentive for him to make the investment required to 
6. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (Gould 2012).
7. Id.
8. See Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
9. Id.
10. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
11. Id. at 563–64.
12. Id. at 575.
13. Id. at 578–79.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 566–67.
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produce a performance of interest to the public.”16 As noted by the 
Court, liability in right of publicity cases is generally limited to the use 
of plaintiff’s picture or name in connection with the promotion or 
advertisement of a product or service.17 
A. State Statutory Right of Publicity Claims
Many states, such as California and New York, have statutory
causes of action for right of publicity.  It is helpful to explore each 
state’s right of publicity laws in more depth. 
1. The California Right of Publicity Statute
Section 3344 of the California Civil Code states, in relevant part:
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products,
merchandise, goods or services, without such person’s prior
consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person or persons injured as a result thereof.18
The California Supreme Court, in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., held that the defendant artist’s sale of lithographs 
and t-shirts which reproduced a drawing depicting the former comedy 
act, “The Three Stooges,” violated the publicity rights statute 
prohibiting such use without consent.19 
16. Id. at 576.
17. Id.
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2012).
19. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800 (2001).  See also
Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 693 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that former 
major league pitcher Don Newcombe’s likeness was used to beer company’s and 
advertising company’s commercial advantage in violation of plaintiff’s common law rights 
regarding unauthorized commercial use of name and likeness); Eastwood v. Nat’l 
Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting actor Clint Eastwood judgment 
against tabloid newspaper based on the commercial misappropriation of his name, likeness 
and personality through misrepresentation of an article based on an exclusive interview 
with him); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 415 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a 
well-known athlete stated claims under California common and statutory law for 
misappropriation of his identity by alleging that advertiser used his former name, Lew 
Alcindor, in television commercials). 
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2. The New York Right of Publicity Statute
Similar to California’s statute, New York’s statutory right of
publicity that prohibits the use of one’s name and likeness for 
commercial purposes.20  Section 50 of the New York Civil Rights 
Code provides that a living person’s name, portrait or picture may not 
be used for advertising purposes without the person’s written 
consent.21 
IV. Defenses to Right of Publicity Actions in Social Media
There are typically three main defenses to right of publicity claims
in the social media context: (1) section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act22 (“CDA”), (2) a license to use the likeness—either 
express or implied,23 and (3) the First Amendment.24  Section 230 of 
the CDA is a defense unique to Internet and social media companies. 
Moreover, express and implied consent is currently at issue in a great 
deal of litigation due to the consents put into the Terms of Use, to 
which users of websites such as Facebook are required to agree. 
Finally, First Amendment cases have a split in authority, which 
further clouds the issue. 
20.  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (GOULD 2012).
21. See, e.g. Beverly v. Choices Women’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 532 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988), aff’d, 587 N.E. 2d 275 (N.Y. 1991), appeal dismissed, 73 N.Y.2d 785, 533 
N.E.2d 673 (1988) (upholding summary judgment and damage award in favor of plaintiff, 
finding that the use of plaintiff’s photograph on defendant’s calendar was a commercial 
use); Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 F. 2d 1319 (N.Y. 1982) (finding that plaintiff stated 
sufficient claims for relief against free-lance photographer and photographic agency for 
the nonconsensual publication of a photograph of plaintiff which constituted the use of 
plaintiff’s name and likeness for purposes of trade under New York law); Davis v. High 
Soc’y Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 
438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Booth v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 223 N.Y.S.2d 737 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1962); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E. 2d 543 (N.Y. 1966), vacated 
& remanded, 387 U.S. 239, motion to amend remittitur granted, 20 N.Y.2d 752, 229 NE.2d 
712, 283 N.Y.S.2d 119, on reconsideration in light of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); 
after re-argument, the court of appeals in Spahn reaffirmed the damages award and the 
injunction against the sale of the book, 233 N.E. 2d 84, (N.Y. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 
U.S. 1046 (1969); Bi-Rite Enters. Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(explaining posters, buttons, passes, bumper stickers and other items bearing pictures of 
rock musicians without their consent justified granting summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs); Clark v. Celeb Publ’g, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Ali v. Playgirl, 
Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Grant v. Esquire, 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
22. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
23.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 10:13 (2nd
ed. 2012). 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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A. Immunity Under Section 230 of the CDA
Section 230 of the CDA provides immunity to social media
websites for tortious actions of third party users.25  The two exceptions 
to this immunity are intellectual property claims and situations in 
which the website acts in conjunction with the third party user, such 
that the website becomes a “content provider.”26  As to the 
intellectual property exception, there is a split of authority as to 
whether the right of publicity claims are actually intellectual property 
claims.  The majority view is that right of publicity claims are 
intellectual property claims, and thus, the immunity under section 230 
of the CDA does not apply.  However, the minority view, which only 
the Ninth Circuit currently adopts, is that section 230 immunity 
applies and is a bar to right of publicity claims.27 
At the time of this writing, six courts across the United States 
have analyzed whether section 230 of the CDA bars right of publicity 
claims.  These are all federal decisions, and come from the First, 
Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.  Only the Ninth Circuit has 
determined that immunity bars right of publicity claims. 
1. First Circuit
In 2007, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that state law
claims for trademark dilution are “[c]laims based on intellectual 
property laws [and] are not subject to Section 230 immunity in 
Universal Communication Systems v. Lycos.28  
The following year, in Doe v. Friendfinder,29 a federal district 
court in New Hampshire ruled a state claim for infringement of the 
right of publicity is an intellectual property claim, such that the CDA 
does not immunize an ISP from liability, expressly disagreeing with 
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the Perfect 10 case30 (discussed below). 
2. Second Circuit
In a 2009 case, Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc.31




28. Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422–23 (1st
Cir. 2007). 
29. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008).
30. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751 (9th  2007).
31. Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc. 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
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that Section 230 did not apply to state or common law copyright 
claims (disagreeing with Perfect 10 decision and agreeing with Doe v. 
Friendfinder).  
The same court found in the 2001 case, Gucci America Inc. v. Hall 
& Associates,32 that New York state trademark infringement and 
unfair competition under New York law were within the intellectual 
property exception to the immunity. 
3. Ninth Circuit
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,33 the Ninth Circuit held that the
term “intellectual property” in Section 230 (e)(2) means only federal 
intellectual property (not state regimes like right of publicity), which 
dramatically increased the protection for defendants claiming 
immunity under Section 230.  
4. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit, in a 2006 case, Almeida v. Amazon.com,
Inc.34  explained that “there appears to be no dispute that the right of 
publicity is a type of intellectual property right” and found state as 
well as federal intellectual property laws to be excluded from section 
230’s immunity. 
How would the United States Supreme Court rule in light of this 
split?  The Doe v. Friendfinder court noted how the United States 
Supreme Court interprets the word “any” in a statute enacted by 
Congress.35  It explained, “the modifier ‘any’ in section 230(e)(2), 
employed without any limiting language, amounts to ‘expansive 
language [that] offers no indication whatever that Congress intended 
[a] limiting construction.’”36
The term “any” law pertaining to intellectual property should
mean just that: “any” law, which obviously includes state intellectual 
property laws.37  The Harrison Court’s interpretation of “any,” as well 
32. Gucci America Inc. v. Hall & Associates, 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) 
33. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751, 768 (9th Cir. 2007), opinion
amended on other grounds on denial of reh’g, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 709 (2007). 
34. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2006).
35. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008).
36. Id. (quoting the Supreme Court in Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 589
(1980)). 
37. Id.
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as the Supreme Court’s protection of the Right of Publicity in the 
only case which addresses that claim,38 suggests the Supreme Court 
would side with the majority view. 
The Atlantic court’s discussion of the erroneous analysis in Perfect 
10, and that case’s inherent contradiction with other Ninth Circuit 
cases is worth quoting.  The party seeking immunity from the state 
law intellectual property claim in that case, Playlist, relied on the 
Perfect 10 case.39  The Atlantic court rejected the Ninth Circuit 
opinion and stated, “In support of its position, Playlist relies heavily 
on a 2007 Ninth Circuit case in which the Ninth Circuit held that the 
term ‘intellectual property’ in the CDA really means ‘federal 
intellectual property.’”40   
The problem with Playlist’s argument is that it lacks any support 
in the plain language of the CDA.41  In four different points in section 
230(e), Congress specified whether it intended a subsection to apply 
to local, state, or federal law.42  It is therefore clear from the statute 
that if Congress wanted the phrase “any law pertaining to intellectual 
property” to actually mean “any federal law pertaining to intellectual 
property,” it would have made that clear, but chose not to.43 
38. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
39. Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 703
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
40. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In the
absence of a definition from Congress, we construe the term ‘intellectual property’ to 
mean ‘federal intellectual property.’”).  This aspect of the court’s holding appears to be 
inconsistent with other Ninth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, 
Inc., 367 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Absent a definition from Congress, we interpret 
the words using their ordinary, contemporary, and common meanings.”), rev’d en banc on 
other grounds, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005); Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 
875 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It is axiomatic that, in construing a statute, courts generally give 
words not defined in a statute their ordinary or natural meaning.”) (internal citation and 
quotations omitted); United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“Where a statutory term is not defined in the statute, it is appropriate to accord the term 
its ordinary meaning.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
41. The Ninth Circuit did not engage in a textual analysis.  Atl. Recording Corp., 603
F. Supp. 2d at 703.
42. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(e)(1) (“any other Federal criminal statute”), (3) (“any State
law” and “any State or local law”), (4) (“any similar State law”) (emphasis added in all). 
43. Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (“[I]t is a general
principle of statutory construction that when ‘Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed 
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” 
(quoting Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 
(1997) (holding that “any other term of imprisonment” includes both state and federal 
terms of imprisonment because “Congress did not add any language limiting the breadth 
of that word, and so we must read [the statute] as referring to all ‘terms of 
imprisonment’”). 
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Moreover, the modifier “any” in section 230(e)(2), employed 
without any limiting language, “amounts to ‘expansive language [that] 
offers no indication whatever that Congress intended [a] limiting 
construction.’”44  This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, as 
discussed above, the “surrounding statutory language” supports the 
conclusion that Congress intended the word “any” to mean any state 
or federal law pertaining to intellectual property.45 
Because the plain language of the CDA is clear, as “any law” 
means both state and federal law, the Court need not engage in an 
analysis of the CDA’s legislative history or purpose.46  How the 
United States Supreme Court would rule remains an open question, 
but past precedent gives guidance. 
B. Plaintiff Consented to the Use of Right of Publicity
On the issue of “consent,” meaning the plaintiff consented to
defendant’s use of his or her likeness, the issue typically turns on the 
scope of the likeness granted.  For example, the terms of use of many 
websites, such as Facebook, permit the use of the name and likeness 
of users.47  Specifically, Facebook’s terms of service states, “your 
name and profile picture may be associated with commercial, 
sponsored, or related content . . . served or enhanced by us. You give 
us permission to use your name and profile picture in connection with 
that content, subject to the limits you place.”48 
The legal issue is typically whether the use of the likeness at issue 
is within the scope of the grant of likeness.  The law is well settled 
that the right to use someone’s likeness can be limited in scope. 
According to J. Thomas McCarthy:  
The right of publicity need not be assigned for any and all 
uses; it may be assigned limited to certain uses, such as the 
44. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H. 2008)
(quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980)). 
45. See ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that word
“any” in statute “deserves an expansive application where the surrounding statutory 
language and other relevant legislative context support it”). 
46. See Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is axiomatic
that the plain meaning of a statute controls its interpretation and that judicial review must 
end at the statute’s unambiguous terms.  Legislative history and other tools of 
interpretation may be relied upon only if the terms of the statute are ambiguous.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
47. Terms, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Apr. 2,
2012). 
48. Id.
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identity in a specific photograph.49  For example, a model 
consent agreement may . . . specifically assign the model’s 
right of publicity inherent in the use of a specific photo or 
photos.  This makes it clear that the assignee has the power to 
enforce the right of publicity of the model in a commercial use 
of that image.50 
While assent may take place even through assent to “Terms of 
Use,” there are limitations to consent.  Even if someone consents to 
the taking of a photograph subject to express limitations or conditions 
as to the manner in which the photograph will be used or published, 
the photographer’s selling, licensing or exploiting the photograph 
beyond the scope of the limited permission or release is wrongful, 
actionable and can constitute grounds for injunctive relief and for 
recovery of damages.51 
The Court’s analysis in Brinkley v. Casablancas is also 
instructive.52  In that action, model Christie Brinkley sought to enjoin 
the unauthorized publication, distribution and sale of posters of her 
photograph in violation of her right of privacy and her right of 
publicity, and sought compensatory, emotional distress, and 
exemplary damages, among other claims.53  Brinkley had not signed a 
release authorizing distribution of her photograph or likeness.54  The 
court explained: 
49.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 10:13 (2nd
ed. 2005) (citing Del Amo v. Baccash, No. CV 07-663 PSG, 2008 WL 2780978 (C.D. Cal. 
July 15, 2008)). 
50. Id.
51. Clark v. Celeb Publ’g, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Douglass v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that despite the fact that Douglass 
consented to the photographs being published in Playboy magazine, the unauthorized 
publication in Hustler magazine was actionable and justified an award of damages); 
Genesis Publ’ns v. Goss, 437 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding the publication 
of nude photo of model exceeded the scope of the original consent, and therefore was 
actionable); McCabe v. Vill. Voice, 550 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating the 
publication of nude photo in the centerfold section of a particular magazine was held to be 
wrongful and actionable since it exceeded the scope of the original consent); Barrows v. 
Rozansky, 11 A.D.2d 105, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding an ex-
boyfriend’s sale of nude photos to media based on recent notoriety concerning plaintiff to 
be violation of right of publicity.  Injunction was granted). See RESTATEMENT SECOND 
TORTS § 892A(4). 
52. Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)
53. Id. at 1005–06.
54. Id. at 1006.
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Moreover, plaintiff never authorized distribution of the 
particular photograph or poster.  While she undoubtedly 
permitted photographs of herself to be taken which might be 
used on a poster for commercial sale, she reserved the right, 
prior to their commercial exploitation, to reject or approve 
the use to which the photographs would be put. . . . Here, 
plaintiff never gave final approval to the poster nor did she 
give oral or written consent to its release.55 
In Dzurenko v. Jordache, the Plaintiff, a male commercial model, 
posed for photographs and signed a release wherein he inserted the 
words “magazine ad use only.”56  Jordache used the photographs on 
posters and distributed to retailers for advertising purposes.57  
Although the lower court determined that plaintiff had consented to 
the commercial exploitation of his photograph and may not now be 
heard to complain that its use infringed his privacy, the Court of 
Appeals of New York reversed, holding that the use went beyond the 
scope of plaintiff’s consent.58  The court stated: “A defendant’s 
immunity from a claim for invasion of privacy is no broader than the 
consent executed to him.  Whether the limitation in the consent is as 
to time, form, or forum, the use of a name, portrait or picture is 
without consent if it exceeds the limitation.”59 
In Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., the Canessa family consented to an 
article being written about the family and posed for a picture in 
conjunction with the article, which was published in defendant’s 
magazine.60  Defendant then had reprints of the article made and used 
it for advertising purposes for commercial advancement.61  Denying 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the New Jersey Superior 
Court held: “If the actual invasion goes beyond the contract, fairly 
construed, as for example by alteration of the plaintiff’s picture, or 
publicity differing materially in kind or in extent from that 
contemplated, or exceeding the authorized duration, there is 
liability.”62  Citing several other cases, the court stated: 
55. Id. at 1008–09.
56. Dzurenko v. Jordache, 451 N.E. 2d 477 (N.Y. 1983)
57. Id.
58. Id. at 478.
59. Id. (quoting Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E. 2d 108, 112 (N.Y. 1983)) (emphasis
added). 
60. Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., A.2d 62, 64–65 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967).
61. Id. at 65.
62. Id. at 79–80; WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 850–51 (3d ed. 1964).
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Many of the cases in which the right of privacy has been 
protected are instances where plaintiff had consented to his or 
her photograph being taken in the first instance, but because 
defendant then used the photograph for a further and 
different purpose, for its own commercial benefit, it is held 
that there is no waiver or consent for such latter use.63 
In Faber v. Condecor, Inc., plaintiffs granted a license to Kodak to 
use a particular photograph “for the purpose of illustration, 
advertising, trade or publication in any manner.”64  The photograph 
appeared in two editions of a publication by Kodak.65  Defendant, 
Condecor, took the picture from the Kodak publication, without 
plaintiff’s or Kodak’s permission, and used the picture to advertise 
picture frames which defendant sold commercially.66  After a jury 
trial, plaintiff was awarded $45,000 for invasion of privacy.67  The 
Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the verdict, relying 
heavily on Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc.,68 and stated: “Defendant’s use 
of plaintiff’s picture was not contemplated by the agreement between 
plaintiffs and Kodak.”69 “One who appropriates to his own use or 
benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of privacy.”70 
In Russell v. Marboro Books, plaintiff was a model who signed a 
consent to “unrestricted use” of her photograph by a named 
photographer and by unnamed “advertisers and assigns” and waived 
her right “to inspect or approve advertising matter used in connection 
therewith.”71  The original photograph was for an educational book 
advertisement in a newspaper and on posters in bookstores.72  The 
photographer sold the photo to the book store, which in turn sold the 
photo to a bed sheets company which retouched and substantially 
altered the photograph and used it with vulgar and salacious captions 
in an advertisement in defendant magazines.73  The court held 
63. Canessa, 235 A. 2d at 80 (citations omitted).
64. Faber v. Condecor, Inc., 477 A.2d 1289, 1291 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1290.
67. Id. at 1294.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1292.
71. Russell v. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 18–19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 36.
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plaintiff could maintain a cause of action against the bed sheets 
company and magazines for violation of right of privacy and 
defamation, despite the open-ended scope of license.74 
“If a jury finds that the changes in plaintiff’s picture were 
substantial and were not consented to, her signed consent cannot be 
construed to authorize a libel upon her person and her professional 
standing.”75 
In Leavy v. Cooney, the plaintiff, a county prosecutor, had 
entered into an agreement with the defendant, a filmmaker, agreeing 
to appear before cameras and narrate a made for television 
documentary regarding a criminal case that he had prosecuted based 
on the express condition that it would be exhibited only on television 
and not in theaters.76  Since the defendant exhibited the film in 
theaters, exceeding the consent given by plaintiff, the court affirmed 
not only the award of compensatory damages and punitive damages 
against the defendant but also affirmed the granting of an injunction 
prohibiting further exploitation of the picture in theaters.77 
C. First Amendment Defense
Certain uses of one’s name and likeness may be protected by the
First Amendment.  Thus, for example, the use of a personality’s name 
or likeness in a magazine story, even if motivated by profit, may or 
may not be actionable.  The Ninth Circuit rejected actor Dustin 
Hoffman’s claim that a magazine profited by using his likeness in a 
picture from a film.78  In that case, the district court found that 
Hoffman’s photograph from the film Tootsie was used to “attract 
attention” and sell magazines, which the Ninth Circuit rejected.79  
However, the Eleventh Circuit recently took the exact opposite view 
in a case by Nancy Benoit’s estate against Hustler magazine.80  Nancy, 
a famous wrestler, was killed by her husband.81  Hustler magazine 
acquired decades-old photographs of the model to illustrate and 
article about her death.82  Nancy’s estate sued, stating that Hustler was 
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Leavy v. Cooney, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580, 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
77. Id. at 584–85.
78. Hoffman v. Capital Cities, 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001).
79. Id. at 1186.
80. Toffoloni v. LFB Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1689 (2010). 
81. Id. at 1204.
82. Id.
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using her name and likeness for advertising purposes.83  Hustler 
argued that the article was newsworthy and protected by the First 
Amendment.84  After the Eleventh Circuit agreed that Nancy’s estate 
had a claim, Hustler appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
which denied cert.85  The Eleventh Circuit explained that the Court 
must look to the uses with an eye towards what is “reasonable.”86 
V. How Social Media Companies and Other Websites Can
Protect Themselves From Right of Publicity Claims
Social media companies and websites can navigate around claims 
for violation of one’s right of publicity by obtaining the consent of the 
users.  Advertisers on those websites should obtain specific 
agreement from any user that is used in one of its advertisements.87 
The following explains the process of obtaining the consent of users 
based upon the most recent case law pertaining to consent to terms of 
use. 
A. Terms of Use
The easiest way for companies providing online services to
protect themselves against claims for violation of a person’s right of 
publicity is by establishing terms and conditions for the use of their 
online services.  When a company’s services include aggregating user 
information, standard practice should be to include provisions in their 
Terms of Use (as hereafter defined).  Terms of Use, also sometimes 
known as “Terms of Service,” are rules which one must agree to 
abide by in order to use a service or website. 
The website’s Terms of Use should grant the website a non-
exclusive, perpetual, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable, 
worldwide (or throughout the universe) license for the right to use a 
person’s name and likeness for the promotion, development and 
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1207.
85. LFP Publ’g Grp. v. Toffoloni, 130 S. Ct. 1689 (2010).
86. Toffoloni, 572 F.3d at 1211.
87. This note focuses on how the websites themselves can protect against right of
publicity claims similar to those brought against Facebook.  Advertisers must make sure 
they have the consent of anyone they are using in advertisements.  Whether an advertiser 
wants to rely on the websites Terms of Use or Terms of Service depends upon the risk 
acceptance of the advertiser, and is not recommended.  An agreement should be made 
between an advertiser and any person used in an advertisement.  For a sample agreement, 
see www.SocialMediaLaw.com/AdvertiserLikenessAgreement. 
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general operation of the website.  Further, a company should reserve 
the right to sub-license a user’s name and likeness to third parties, 
such as advertisers, for the same or similar uses.  In the event that a 
person’s name or likeness is displayed on a website without that 
person’s consent, a procedure should be in place under Terms of Use 
allowing that person to have the content removed upon a showing of 
misappropriation. 
B. Acceptance of Terms of Use by the Users
To ensure acceptance of Terms of Use, users should be required
to accept the terms prior to the use of any services on the website. 
This includes any mobile variants of the website and any applications 
used in conjunction with the website.  Actual display of the Terms of 
Use and affirmative acceptance of those terms can be achieved in 
different ways. 
Terms of Use can be displayed in their entirety before a person 
may create a user profile on a website.  They can also be displayed as 
a hyperlink upon a person accessing a website. 
A company will want an affirmative acceptance of those terms, 
including the terms granting use of the right of publicity, by all 
persons prior to creating a user profile or accessing portions of 
websites containing user-generated content.  A click wrap agreement 
allows a user to read through a dialog box containing the terms of use, 
and can require the user to affirmatively acknowledge those terms, 
clicking “Accept” for example, before being granted use of a website 
or the ability to upload media onto that website.88  If a user does not 
agree to the terms of use, the user does not have to click “Accept” or 
otherwise use the website.  Even where the full terms of use are not 
presented on the same page as the “Acceptance” button, where the 
user was provided the opportunity to review those Terms of Use in 
the form of a sufficiently conspicuous hyperlink, the user has assented 
to those terms by clicking “Accept.”89 
The Terms, including those pertaining to right of publicity, are 
deemed sufficiently conspicuous if notice is given on the home page 
and on any page requiring an action by the user to precede use of the 
website, stating that anyone proceeding past that page has assented to 
the Terms of Use.90  Once terms are found to be sufficiently 
88. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d. 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
89. Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
90. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003). 
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conspicuous, enforceability of those terms “does not depend on [the 
user] actually having read them” before “Accepting” said terms.91 
C. Notice of Modification
Once a user has agreed to the Terms of Use of a website, the user
must be placed on notice if any of those terms are removed or 
modified, or if additional terms are included. 
Notice can be given as a message posted within the website for 
notifying users of any modifications made to the Terms of Use.92 
Alternatively, if the website requires that users register an email 
address, notice can be given via an email message.93  Notice provided 
should specify what sections within the Terms of Use have been 
added, removed or modified.94  Mere posting of the revised terms on 
the offeror’s website does not provide the necessary notice to users.95 
VI. Conclusion
Based upon courts’ willingness to hold a person has “signed” an 
agreement by clicking “Accept” to the same extent as someone who 
signs a written contract, companies would be prudent to ensure that 
users visiting their website affirmatively click “Accept” regarding 
their Terms of Use.  In the alternative, companies can design websites 
such that users are given sufficiently conspicuous notice as to the 
existence of the Terms of Use, and the mere use of the website is an 
assent to those sufficiently conspicuous terms. 
If a website is particularly concerned about the right of publicity, 
it can allow a user to “opt out” of allowing his or her right of publicity 
to be used.  For example, Google’s privacy policy states:  
When you sign up for a Google Account, we ask you for 
personal information. We may combine the information you 
submit under your account with information from other 
Google services or third parties in order to provide you with a 
better experience and to improve the quality of our services. 
91. Druyan v. Jagger, 508 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); See also People v.
Direct Revenue LLC., No. 401325/2006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2008). 
92. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d. 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1066–67.
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For certain services, we may give you the opportunity to opt 
out of combining such information.96   
Statements such as these help ensure that the needs and 
concerns of both users and providers of social media platforms 
are addressed. 
96. See Policies and Principles, GOOGLE http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/
privacy/archive/20111020 (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
